Federal Courts - Indians: The Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe: Reinvigorating the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity by Wastewin, Wambdi Awanwicake
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 73 Number 3 Article 5 
1997 
Federal Courts - Indians: The Eleventh Amendment and Seminole 
Tribe: Reinvigorating the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity 
Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wastewin, Wambdi Awanwicake (1997) "Federal Courts - Indians: The Eleventh Amendment and Seminole 
Tribe: Reinvigorating the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 73 : No. 3 , 
Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol73/iss3/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
FEDERAL COURTS-INDIANS: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND SEMINOLE TRIBE: REINVIGORATING THE DOCTRINE OF
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Seminole Tribe v. Florida
116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
In the United States, there are three major governmental entities:
the federal government, state governments, and tribal governments. In
March of 1996, the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida] case
reassessed the balance of power between these three governmental
entities. This reassessment cast into doubt certain previously relied upon
federal causes of action. Seminole Tribe, expressly overruled the 1989
Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., resulting in
far-reaching consequences for private actions authorized by federal law
against state governments. This case comment will explore the impact of
Seminole Tribe on both federal Indian law and the Eleventh Amend-
ment's guarantee of state sovereign immunity.
In Part I, the facts and case history of Seminole Tribe will be set out.
Part II will examine the legal background of the Seminole Tribe decision
in terms of the intended purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity through a historical per-
spective. Part III will contain the case analysis of the Seminole Tribe
decision. Finally, Part IV evaluates the positive impact of the decision
for Tribes as a reaffirmance of the federal-tribal relationship, as provid-
ing benefits to the Tribes by strengthening the doctrine of sovereignty,
and as resolving federalism concerns raised by cases brought by Tribes
as a sovereign power within the United States.
I. FACTS
In January of 1991, following the provisions of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA),2 the Seminole Tribe 3 requested that Florida
Governor Lawton Chiles engage in negotiations for a compact governing
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114(1996).
2. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (providing negotiation procedures for
Tribes and States to enter into compacts for Class III gaming on Indian lands).
3. The Seminole Tribe of Florida is a federally recognized Indian tribe comprised of five sepa-
rate reservations in the state of Florida with all of the powers of self-government over its tribal lands.
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (No. 94-12).
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the conduct of class III gaming. 4 The Seminole Tribe, although
contending that casino-type games were permitted in Florida, did not
immediately request casino-type games in its compact proposal. 5 Rather,
the Seminole Tribe included the following gaming activities: poker, all
video, electronic, and computer-aided games duplicating poker, bingo,
pull-tabs, lotto, punchboards, tip jars, instant bingo, and games similar to
bingo. 6 Governor Chiles responded through his General Counsel on
May 24, 1991, by rejecting all of the proposed games with the exception
of poker. 7
In response, the Tribe sent another letter to Governor Chiles request-
ing his personal involvement in the negotiations and stating that the pro-
cess was entirely unsatisfactory to date. 8 In August of 1991, Governor
Chiles restated that Florida would not negotiate any form of gaming that
was not expressly permitted by state statute.9 The Governor limited the
negotiation to previously state-approved gambling activities: poker,
other card games, raffles, parimutuel wagering on dog and horse racing,
and jai alai.10 In September of 1991, representatives of the Seminole
Tribe met with Florida officials who refused to change their position on
negotiations." On September 19, 1991, the Seminole Tribe filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
against the State of Florida and its governor to compel good faith
negotiations for a class III gaming compact. 12 In response, the State of
Florida raised its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as a defense
against the suit and motioned to dismiss the case. 13 The district court
4. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12). See also Indian Gaming Regulation Act
of 1988, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(6)-(8) (1994). Class I gaming is defined as "social games solely for
prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or
in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id. § 2703(6). Class I1 gaming is defined as
including bingo, card games, pull-tabs, and other games of that sort. Id. § 2703(7). Class II gaming
explicitly does not include "(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or
blackjack (21), or (ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot
machines of any kind." Id. § 2703(7)(B). Class III gaming is defined as "all forms of gaming that are
not class I gaming or class II gaming." Id. § 2703(8).
5. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Seminole Tribe (No. 94-12).
6. Id. (accompanying the compact proposal was a letter where the Seminole Tribe expressed its






12. Id. at 7-8 (requesting that the IGRA remedial scheme be invoked by granting an order that a
compact be concluded within 60 days, and if the compact was not then concluded that the court
appoint a mediator and that the court issue a declaratory judgment that Florida was required under the
IGRA to negotiate with the Tribe for class III gaming); see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp.
655, 663 (S.D. Fla. 1992) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe I] (holding that Congress did have the power to
force states into federal court for violation of the IGRA's compacting provisions).
13. See Seminole Tribe 1, 801 F. Supp. at 656. The state argued that Congress did not have the
power to provide the Tribe with a judicial remedy against the state in the face of the Eleventh
Amendment's bar. Id.
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denied the state's motion.14 The district court held that the IGRA,
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause,15 was within Congress'
power to abrogate state immunity.16 Following the district court's
decision, the state filed an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.17
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
decision. 18 The court held: (1) the state had not consented to suit;19
(2) Congress intended to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity in enacting the IGRA;20 and (3) Congress lacked authority to
abrogate states' immunity by enacting the IGRA.21 The court of appeals
also stated that the doctrine of Ex parte Young 22 was inapplicable to
compel the Governor of the State of Florida to negotiate a class III
gaming compact. 23
14. Id. at 663 (finding that Congress had expressed a clear intention to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity and had the authority to do so under the Indian Commerce Clause).
15. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes"); FELIX COHEN, FELIX
COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232-33 (1982). The Indian Commerce Clause functions as
the sole provision within the United States Constitution that authorizes any powers whatsoever in
relation to Indian tribes. Id.
16. See Seminole Tribe 1, 801 F. Supp. at 658. The district court reached this result by using the
principles articulated in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), as a guide.
17. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, II F.3d 1016 (1 1th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe II]
(refusing to acknowledge congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting the
IGRA through power given under the Indian Commerce Clause). Consolidated with the case at the
Eleventh Circuit was a similar case that arose when the Poarch Band of Creek filed suit against the
state of Alabama and its governor to resolve issues regarding the IGRA definitions of class Ill gaming.
Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991). Alabama moved to
dismiss on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds and the district court granted the motion.
Id. at 563. In addition, the governor of Alabama also moved to dismiss when the Poarch Band
amended their complaint to include an Ex parte Young action against him and a § 1983 claim that the
Tribe and its members were deprived property and liberty interests without due process. Poarch Band
of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1550 (S.D. Ala. 1992). That motion to dismiss was
likewise granted. Id. at 1553.
18. Seminole Tribe 11, 11 F.3d at 1022 (finding that neither Florida nor Alabama had consented to
suit and therefore, the Eleventh Amendment guarantee of state sovereign immunity barred the IGRA
remedial scheme).
19. Id.; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.6 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that it is firmly
established that a state may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit in federal court, thus
escaping the Eleventh Amendment bar).
20. Seminole Tribe II, II F.3d at 1024; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, §7.7, at 414 (explaining
that recent court cases have found that statutes adopted under any of Congress' constitutional authority
may serve as a basis for suit against a state in federal court as long as the federal law's text expresses
a clear intention to authorize jurisdiction over the state).
21. Seminole Tribe 11, 11 F.3d at 1026 (refusing to expand the congressional power under the
Interstate Commerce power to abrogate state sovereign immunity for the purposes of the Indian
Commerce Clause).
22. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Exparte Young holds that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
for injunctive relief against a state official for actions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection guarantees. Id.
23. Seminole Tribe II, II F.3d at 1028 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The
Eleventh Circuit found that the Tribe could not employ the doctrine for two reasons: (1) the doctrine
could not be used to compel the undertaking of a discretionary task by an executive official; and (2)
the doctrine was unavailable when the suit was in reality against the state. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:517
The Seminole Tribe appealed to the United States Supreme Court
and certiorari was granted.24 With Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the
majority the Court held that the Seminole Tribe's suit was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment 25 and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young was not
available to compel the Florida Governor to negotiate a compact under
the IGRA.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legal background of the IGRA and the historical development
of the Eleventh Amendment's doctrine of sovereign immunity will be
explored in order to provide a comprehensive context to realize the
implications of the Seminole Tribe decision.
A. IGRA's MANDATORY TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT
REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS III GAMING IN INDIAN COUNTRY
From 1983 to 1987, numerous Indian gaming bills introduced in
Congress were never voted on due to the controversies surrounding the
regulation of gaming in Indian Country. 27 The IGRA was passed as a
compromise. 28 Prior to the passing of the IGRA, both the states and the
tribes advocated for exclusive regulation of gaming in Indian Country
prior to the IGRA.29 The compromise finally reached in the IGRA
24. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995) (granting certiorari).
25. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe III].
The majority was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 1119. Justice
Souter filed a dissent which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Id.
26. Id. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, four other petitions for certiorari were
granted. See Jessup v. Blackfeet Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996) (mem.) (vacating and remanding for
further consideration in light of the Seminole Tribe III decision); Montana v. Fort Belknap Indian
Community, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996) (mem.) (vacating and remanding for further consideration in light
of the Seminole Tribe III decision); Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996) (mem.)
(vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of the Seminole Tribe III decision);
Washington v. Spokane Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1410 (1996) (mem.) (vacating and remanding for further
consideration in light of the Seminole Tribe III decision).
27. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 27. "Indian Country" is the formal government term for
tribally-owned land, as compared to the more popular term "Indian reservation." Id.
28. Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
769, 774 (1995). The compromise reached was largely due to the Tribes' victory in a then recent
Supreme Court decision, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1986). Id. In
Cabazon, the Court held that since California permitted bingo and specific card games, it therefore
acted in a regulatory manner and not in a criminal manner towards these types of gaming. Cabazon,
480 U.S. at 211. State regulation of tribal gaming was found to be an impermissible infringement on
tribal government. Id. at 222.
29. See Roland J. Santoni, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: How Did We Get Here? Where
Are We Going?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387, 398 (1993). Many states advocated for the application of
state law and jurisdiction over gaming in Indian Country since the states were able to assert jurisdiction
in certain criminal matters. Id. at 398. However, the courts were increasingly finding that if the states
allowed gaming then a distinction between regulation and criminal jurisdiction would put gaming
outside of any state criminal jurisdiction over Indian gaming. Id. at 401. At the same time, tribal
advocates such as Republican Senator John McCain, I1, of Arizona argued that states would not fairly
regulate Indian gaming. Id. at 403.
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allowed for: (1) the division of gaming into three classes; 30 (2) the
creation of the National Indian Gaming Commission to regulate Class III
gaming; 3 1 and (3) state participation by requiring tribal-state compacts
for class III gaming. 32 The inclusion of tribal-state compacts for class
III gaming has been said to be a congressional attempt to pacify the
states. 33 By mandating that the tribes negotiate with the states for elec-
tronic and slot machine type games, Congress shifted its duty under the
Indian Commerce Clause 34 and deferred to the states' concerns that
Indian-owned casinos would displace state tourism endeavors. 35 Purpor-
tedly to protect Indian country from infiltration by organized crime, 36
Congress limited tribal control over the types of gaming allowed by
forcing the tribes to negotiate with the states, rather than allowing the
tribes to decide for themselves the types of gaming to include in their
own casinos. 37
30. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(6-8) (1994).
31. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994). This stipulates that the National Indian Gaming Commission
shall be composed of three full-time members including a chairman appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate and two associate members appointed by the Secretary of the
Interior. Id.
32. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(3)(C)(i-vii) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). The tribal-state compacts may
include provisions regarding: (1) either tribal or state criminal and civil laws and regulations for the
licensing or regulation of class III gaming; (2) the proper allocation between the tribe and state for the
enforcement of those laws and regulations; (3) assessment of any amounts necessary to defray state
costs in regulating class III gaming; (4) tribal assessments of taxation in comparable amounts assessed
by the state for class 1I. gaming; (5) appropriate remedies for breach of the tribal-state Compact; (6)
standards and maintenance for the operation of class III gaming and the facility in which it is housed;
and (7) other subjects related to operation of class IlI gaming. Id.
33. See Joseph J. Weissman, Upping the Ante: Allowing Indian Tribes to Sue States in Federal
Court under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 123-24 (1993). "[Gam-
bling on Indian reservations] has alarmed many states harboring concerns about possible negative
criminal, economic, and ethical repercussions associated with gambling. In the 1980s, many states
challenged the legality of gambling on Indian reservations in federal court, usually unsuccessfully."
Id.
34. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 270. The Supreme Court has interpreted the United States
Constitution as delegating paramount authority over tribal affairs to the federal government as well as
recognizing the substantial role of treaties, executive orders, and federal statutes which all preempt
state laws. Id. Additionally since applying state law to Indian Country would greatly restrict tribal
sovereignty, the federal protection of tribal sovereignty has led to the necessary preemption of state
law. See id. at 273.
35. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 41 (1983)
(stating that the Indian Commerce Clause has been interpreted expansively enough to embrace all
areas of Indian life, rather than merely commercial relations for which it was initially intended).
36. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1994) (stating that a purpose of the IGRA was to shield tribes from
"organized crime and other corrupting influences").
37. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Note, What Would John Marshall Say? Does the Federal Trust
Responsibility Protect Tribal Gambling Revenue?, 84 GEO. L.J. 123, 125 (1995). "Politicians, com-
mercial gambling icons, and others have predicted that organized crime will infiltrate Indian gambling
businesses and steal tribal profits. Tribal advocates have countered that this fear is racist, ungrounded
in reality, and a thinly disguised attempt by whites to preserve their monopoly on the gambling
industry." Id. at 125; see also Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 10-11
(D.D.C. 1990) (challenging the IGRA on four grounds: the act violated tribal self-determination
guaranteed in the treaties with the United States government; Congress violated its federal trust
responsibility in passing the act; the act unconstitutionally restricts federal courts from their
constitutional function of resolving cases or controversies; and the act interfered with tribal
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Despite their opposition to state control, the tribes have not blocked
the negotiation process, rather negotiations have failed due to the states'
refusal of all negotiation for gaming compacts and the federal courts'
finding an Eleventh Amendment bar to enforcement of the negotiation
process. 38 The IGRA would prove to be a test of congressional authority
as the question before the federal courts became whether Congress under
the Article I of the Indian Commerce Clause could abrogate state sover-
eign immunity and provide that Indian tribes could hale the states into
federal court for failure to negotiate gaming compacts. 39
B. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
State sovereign immunity jurisprudence has often been inconsistent
and conflicting due to the Supreme Court's need to recognize state
autonomy and, at the same time, ensure state compliance with federal
law. 40 The concept of state sovereign immunity has its roots in early
common law and the text of the Eleventh Amendment. This doctrinal
development of the immunity for states as sovereigns will be explored
more fully below.
1. The Common Law Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity
From the English maxim "the king can do no wrong" developed
the common law principle that a sovereign cannot be subjected to suit
without its consent. 41 In establishing the United States, the vestiges of
English common law were carried over, including the concept of govern-
mental sovereign immunity.42
self-government, violating the Fifth Amendment's due process clause).
38. See, e.g., Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1426-27 (10th Cir. 1994) (filing IGRA
actions by the Ponca Tribe against Oklahoma, the Pueblo of Sandia against New Mexico, the
Mescalero Apache Tribe against New Mexico, and the Kickapoo Tribe against Kansas for failure on
the part of the respective states to negotiate in good faith); Washington v. Spokane Tribe, 28 F.3d 991,
993 (9th Cir. 1994) (filing an IGRA action by the Spokane Tribe based on the failure of Washington to
negotiate in good faith).
39. Lauralyn Brown, Case Comment, Can Congress Constitutionally Abrogate States' Eleventh
Amendment Sovereign Immunity from Suits Initiated By Indian Tribes?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 601, 616
(1995) (asserting that the Supreme Court will ultimately decide whether the states may assert
sovereign immunity when suits are filed under the IGRA and what remedies tribes may have).
40. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 368.
41. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *255 (explaining that the maxim basically stood for
two concepts: first that the king was not answerable to the people personally as this would upset the
balance of power; and second, that the crown could do no injury as it was created for the benefit of
the people).
42. See, e.g.. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 179 (2d ed. 1990). The nature, scope, and extent of governmental sovereign immunity were
never precisely clarified. Id. at 179; Jeffrey Alan Zaluda, Note, Pulliam v. Allen: Harmonizing
Judicial Accountability for Civil Rights Abuses with Judicial Immunity, 34 AM. U. L. R EV. 523, 523 n.4
(1985). When the English colonies issued their Declaration of Independence from Great Britain, they
listed among the injuries and abuses the colonies had suffered at the hands of the British crown that
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The Constitution never explicitly mentioned the sovereign
immunity afforded the national government or the separate states.43 In
constructing the framework of the Union, a delicate balance between the
power of the federal government and the sovereignty of the separate
states was necessary. 44 Under Article III, Section 2, the Constitution
provides that the federal judicial power of the United States shall extend
to controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State." 4 5
Whether state sovereign immunity survived Article III was a topic of
debate among the framers of the Constitution and the state ratifiers. 46
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue in Chisholm v. Georgia, 47 a
case decided prior to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. 48
2. The Adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted under the rare circumstance
of overruling the Supreme Court decision in Chisholm.49 In Chisholm,
the Supreme Court interpreted Article III to grant federal courts jurisdic-
tion over suits against a state brought by a citizen of another state. 50
King George had refused to be held accountable to the colonies. Id. The colonist's "repugnance" for
the King's lack of accountability has been characterized as one of the factors leading to the
Revolutionary War. Id.
43. REDISH, supra note 42, at 179.
44. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 368 (stating: "The Eleventh Amendment is
particularly important in defining the relationship between the federal and state governments and in
determining the scope of constitutional protections").
45. U.S. CONST. art, III, § 2. Relevant portions read:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; ... to Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
46. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 372. The state conventions served as the primary
forums for the debates over whether federal courts would have jurisdiction over suits filed by citizens
of states to collect debts against the states. Id. at 370-72.
47. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793). This case held that under the Constitution and the Judiciary Act
of 1789, states were subject to suit by citizens of another state. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793) (mem.).
48. Id. (reflecting the proposition that the text of the Constitution was clear regarding the ability
to sue states in federal court). When the Chisholm v. Georgia case reached the Supreme Court in
1792, it became one of the most famous cases of the time. CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 46-47 (1972).
49. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNrTED STATES 19-20 (1987). Not even a month
after the decision in Chisholm became finalized, the House and Senate had both proposed the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. The Chisholm decision was greeted with hostility by state legislatures as well.
Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the Assumption
of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1292 (1994). The
extent of the outrage generated by the decision has been debated among legal scholars, however,
"there is little question that the Chisholm decision was the motivating factor behind the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment." Id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 374 (tracing the quick
action of Congress to approve the Eleventh Amendment and noting the delay of the President in
proclaiming the ratification until 1798).
50. See Doyle Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV.
207, 219 (1967). The subject matter of the Chisholm case appeared as a threat to state finances as
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Four of the five Justices 51 of the Court decided that an action of assump-
sit against the State of Georgia brought by a citizen of South Carolina
was permitted under the Constitution. 52 The Court concluded that Arti-
cle III authorized the judicial power to hear suits between a state and citi-
zens of other states. 53 The decision by the Supreme Court caused "such
a shock of surprise throughout the country that the [E]leventh [A]mend-
ment to the [C]onstitution was at once proposed and adopted." 54
The expedient adoption of the Eleventh Amendment may be partly
attributed to the states' fear that federal courts would enforce recovery
of state war debts owed to citizens of other states. 55 The text of the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court brought by citizens of
other states and of foreign states against state governments. 56
The fear of the states' that private citizens could hale states into
federal court'was laid to rest in Hans v. Louisiana.57 The Court, in Hans,
expanded the case law surrounding state sovereign immunity to include
an Eleventh Amendment bar against suits brought by the state's own
citizens. 58 In Hans, the Court announced that "[i]t is not in the power of
individuals to call any State into court." 59 This broad interpretation of
state sovereign immunity by the Supreme Court would become a contro-
well as a challenge to state sovereign immunity. See id. at 217.
51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.2, at 373. The four Justices had all been involved with
various constitutional conventions. "Justices John Blair and James Wilson had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. Justice William Cushing presided over the state ratification convention in
Massachusetts. Chief Justice John Jay was a delegate to the New York ratification convention and
one of the authors of the Federalist Papers." Id.
52. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435. Justice Iredell, in his dissent, argued that the Judiciary
Act of 1789 did not specifically provide for a suit in assumpsit against a state and that these types of
suits against the government were not permitted in English common law. Id. at 429.
53. Id. at 479.
54. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1933); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.2,
at 373-74. The outrage following the Court's decision led to the Georgia legislature enacting a law
which prohibited anyone from enforcing the Supreme Court's decision upon penalty of death by
hanging without the benefit of clergy. Id.
55. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[tihere is a general agreement that the [Eleventh] Amendment was passed because
the States were fearful that federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts");
see also Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson, Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (stating the "impetus for
the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State's
treasury"); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1934 (1983). The Eleventh Amendment was necessary to put aside state
fears that the national government had an interest in enforcing repayment of state Revolutionary War
bills of credit. Id. The ultimate goal for the Federalists, however, was to allay state concerns and
eliminate any new call for a constitutional convention. Id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
57. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (finding that a citizen of the same state could not hale the state into federal
court for repayment of state bonds).
58. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21. The Court reviewed the writings of Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall to support its finding that under Article III of the Constitution the states were
never meant to be amenable to suit in federal court by private parties. Id.
59. Id. at 14 (quoting Madison, defending the objections raised against adoption of the
Constitution at the Virginia convention).
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versial expression of the Eleventh Amendment. 60 The ramifications of
the Court's recognition of state sovereign immunity 6' has had a lasting
impact on the concept of federalism embodied in the Constitution. 62
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
recognized states as sovereigns within the Union.63
3. Reconciling Chisholm, the Adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, and Hans
In articulating Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, three predomi-
nant theories of interpretation have emerged for the meaning behind the
amendment: 1) the constitutional limit on subject matter jurisdiction; 2)
common law immunity; and 3) a limit only on diversity. 64 These theo-
ries emerged as the Court attempted to reconcile the Chisholm decision,
which allowed citizens of other states to sue states in federal court, with
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which barred "any suits" by
citizens of other states or foreign states against states in federal courts,
and Hans, which inferred from the prohibition against other state citizens
and foreign citizens a prohibition against a state's own citizen's to sue a
state in federal court. 65 When examining the following theories, it is im-
perative to keep in mind that the text of the Eleventh Amendment simply
provides that the judicial power shall not extend to: "any suit in law or
60. William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983). Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment did not provide broad-based
immunity for the states, the Court in Hans, found the principle of sovereign immunity sufficient
grounds for exempting the states from all suits by private citizens. Id. at 1088 (citing Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
61. But cf. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (1988) (stating that the concept of sovereignty as derived from a mon-
archy inherently conflicts with the idea of constitutional government where sovereignty is directly
derived from the people).
62. See ORTH, supra note 49 at 152 (stating that only a century ago the Eleventh Amendment was
reconceptualized in the unwritten text of the Constitution as an acknowledgement of state sovereign
immunity and that the Union cannot afford its constituent parts sovereign immunity without
jeopardizing the whole).
63. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13 (referring to Federalist No. 81 in which Hamilton states: "It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent"). But see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (characterizing the departure in Hans from the text of the Eleventh Amendment
to embrace the doctrine of sovereign immunity as lacking coherence in case law, as based on
prudential concerns of federal-state comity, and as an appeal to "Our Federalism" rather than sound
textual interpretation).
64. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 374-381. From the interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment through numerous Supreme Court decisions, separate theories of the doctrinal basis of the
Eleventh Amendment have emerged. Id.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.; Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-11 (drawing the conclusion that it was
illogical not to bar state citizens' suits when citizens of other states and foreign states were barred
from suing state governments in federal court); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 418, 419 (1793)
(mem.) (finding that Article III authorized the federal judiciary to hear suits between states and
citizens of other states).
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equity ... by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State" against one of the state governments. 66
The first theory is that after Hans, sovereign immunity limits federal
courts from hearing any suits against state governments, thereby limiting
the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. 67 Inconsistent with this
interpretation is the Supreme Court's recognition of a state waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, since subject matter jurisdiction is by
definition unaffected by consent. 68 A substantial criticism of this first
theory is that the text of the Eleventh Amendment merely bars suits by
citizens of other states and of foreign states from suing a state, and does
not bar suits against a state's own citizens. 69 Additionally, this theory
implies that law higher than the Constitution (or at least prior to it) has
continuing significance in determining the role of the federal judiciary.
Such a theory is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the foundation
of the United States.70
The second theory, common law immunity, posits that the Eleventh
Amendment is a return to the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the states
prior to the adoption of the Constitution and Article 111.71 Under this
interpretation, Chisholm and Article III altered the states' previous full
sovereign immunity to allow suits from citizens of other states, but the
bar against suits from a state's own citizens remained as a historical limi-
tation. 72 With the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the full sover-
eign immunity under the common law was reinstated to bar all citizen
suits against states. 73 As a common law limitation, legislation could over-
ride the immunity within the confines of constitutional power.74 The
weakness in this second theory is the basis of the decision in Hans, where
the Court did not rely on the Eleventh Amendment as reinstating the
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
67. CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 375 (explaining that this first theory incorporates the
Eleventh Amendment into the broader constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction); see
Pennhurst State Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984) (citing Hans for the proposition that
suits against unconsenting states were not contemplated in the Constitution when Article III was
added).
68. See Welch v. Texas Dep't Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 488 (1987) (stating that
state consent is necessary in a system of dual sovereignties); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.3, at
376-77 (referring to Hans where the Court recognized that states may consent to suit in federal court).
69. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 377 (stating that neither the history of the Eleventh
Amendment as a response to Chisholm nor the text of the amendment establish such a broad-based
limitation on the federal judiciary).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 379. Following this theory, the Eleventh Amendment's text seems irrelevant if the
amendment has the limited purpose of reinstating common law.
72. Id. at 378 (emphasizing Article III, which states that the federal judicial power will extend to
cases between a state and foreign states or citizens).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 379 (articulating the consequence that if it exercises lawful power under the consti-
tution Congress may legislate authorization of suits by a state's own citizens against state government).
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common law. 75 Rather, Hans clearly expressed an unchanged common
law tradition barring suits by a state's own citizens. 76
A third theory of the Eleventh Amendment's purpose relies on the
explicit text of the Eleventh Amendment and views the amendment as
merely a limitation on the diversity suits available to be heard by the
federal courts under Article 111.77 Accepting that the Chisholm decision
was based on a suit by a citizen from another state and that the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted in response to that decision as merely a modi-
fication of Article III's diversity clause, this interpretation is supported
by history. 78 However, it wasn't until 1875 that Congress permanently
provided general federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts,
therefore, federal question jurisdiction could not have been logically
incorporated by the Hans court as a consequence of its ruling.79 Under
this interpretation, Hans was wrongly decided as barring federal question
jurisdiction in suits involving the states and the states own citizens.8 0
Therefore, under the diversity theory, federal question jurisdiction is
unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment and the federal courts are
available to vindicate federal rights for state citizens against their state
governments.81
75. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-59 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[t]here simply is no constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no
constitutionally mandated policy of excluding suits against states from federal courts"); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing state waiver of sovereign immunity as strictly for state law
controversies, not federal question cases); Employees of the Dep't Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309-22 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Eleventh Amendment on its face says nothing about sovereign immunity).
76. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (stating that the sovereign immunity of states from
suit "has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to
be formally asserted"). But see Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson, Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 54 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to the common law doctrine as better suited to "a divinely ordained
monarchy than to our democracy").
77. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 380 (asserting that Article III provides two types of
limitations on the federal judiciary, subject matter and parties (diversity) and that the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment only explicitly addressed the latter limitation).
78. Id. (detailing the diversity provisions of Article III and the subsequent enactment of the
Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on two of those provisions: citizens of other states and citizens of
foreign states against state governments).
79. Id. § 5.2.1., at 253 (outlining the 1875 congressional grant of general federal question
jurisdiction on the federal courts, 77 years after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment).
80. Id. § 7.3, at 381 (following the reasoning of the diversity theory, Hans should not have been
dismissed since federal question jurisdiction was unaffected by the adoption of the Eleventh Amend-
ment); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301-02 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating the Hans decision was based on "misconceived history and misguided logic" and
therefore, was an improper basis for the theory of state immunity from suit in federal court); Fletcher,
supra note 60, at 1084 (stating that the Supreme Court decisions prior to the Civil War were consistent
with the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as a narrowing of the Article III jurisdiction in the
state-citizen diversity clause); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984) (asserting that Hans' rationale and result should be
viewed as an error that was "neither fruitful nor required").
8 1. See Gibbons, supra note 55, at 2004 (stating that Hans' residuum continues as a distortion on
federal-state relations).
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The weakness in the diversity theory stems from its strength as well,
because the text of the Eleventh Amendment provides that "any suit" is
encompassed within its prohibition. 82 It can reasonably be argued that
"any suit" includes federal question suits and that the Hans court
properly pronounced a bar to all suits, whether federal question or not,
which attempted to allow private suits against state governments in feder-
al courts. 83 With the exception of the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co.,84 this third theory on limiting diversity suits has not
prevailed in Supreme Court decisions. 85
These three theories of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence provide
a useful framework in which to understand the Supreme Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe.86 Notwithstanding the theoretical justifica-
tion adopted to perceive Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, the general
rule as it now stands by the Supreme Court is that state sovereign immu-
nity is available for state governments as a barrier to suits brought in
federal court by citizens of other states, foreign states, and a state's own
citizens. 87 This immunity is not absolute as the Court has recognized
three important exceptions to allow private suits in federal courts against
state governments when violative of federal rights. 88
4. Exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment
The Court has only recognized three exceptions to the Eleventh
Amendment bar: state consent, congressional abrogation, and the doc-
trine of Ex parte Young. 89 Each of these exceptions will be explored in
turn.
a. State Consent
Inherent in the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the prerogative of
the sovereign to consent to suit. 90 Within the power of each separate
state is the ability to consent to suit and therefore eliminate the Eleventh
82. U.S. CONST. amend. Xl.
83. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987) (stating
that federal question actions are within the Eleventh Amendment parameters of "suits in law or
equity").
84. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
85. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1989) (finding that the Eleventh
Amendment acts as a limit on the judicial power rather than as a limit on federal question jurisdiction
such as that granted through congressional legislation).
86. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 374 (stating that the three theories are useful in
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
87. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934) (articulating the prohibition of
private suits brought in federal court against states).
88. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 488 (outlining forms of relief available for state violations of federal
rights, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity).
89. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.2 at 369.
90. REDISH, supra note 44, at 203.
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Amendment bar to suits against the states. 91 By consenting to suit in a
federal forum, the state does not waive subject-matter jurisdiction, but
rather the "privilege of enforcing a limitation" on the federal court's
expansive jurisdiction. 92 State waiver allows the federal judiciary to
proceed as if the Eleventh Amendment did not exist.93
In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has interpreted state
participation in areas regulated by federal constitutional power as a
constructive waiver of the Eleventh Amendment. 94 The Court's decision
in Parden v. Terminal Railway95 involved a determination as to whether
portions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) were action-
able against an Alabama-owned railway.9 6 The Court stated that by
making FELA applicable to every railroad in interstate commerce,
Congress intended to include railroads run by states. 97 Because Alabama
was operating a railroad twenty years after the enactment of FELA, the
Court ruled that Alabama had consented to the suit. 98 However, in
subsequent decisions by the Court, constructive waiver has been dis-
favored and the portion of Parden dealing with constructive waiver has
been expressly overruled. 99 This result leads to the conclusion that only
express consentlOO to suit from the states will constitute waiver of the
Eleventh Amendment bar and not simply the participation in federally
regulated areas.101
91. Id.
92. John R. Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REV. 447, 488-89 (1986).
93. Id. at 488.
94. REDISH, supra note 42, at 203-04 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and Petty v. Tennesee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275
(1959)).
95. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
96. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 184-86 (1964) (allowing enforcement of the FELA
damages provisions against the state of Alabama for injuries suffered by employees of the
state-owned railway).
97. Id. at 187-88.
98. Id. at 192.
99. See Welch v. Texas Dep't Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) (overruling
Parden to the extent that it "is inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language").
100. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 9.6, at 410 (stating that there may be a narrow
exception for constructive consent where Congress makes a clear statement that states will be liable in
federal court if they participate in a particular activity and then a state so chooses to voluntarily
engage in that activity).
101. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985) (holding that mere receipt
of federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 did not constitute state waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment bar against private suits); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (stating that the
surrendering of constitutional rights is not normally associated with constructive consent and should not
play a role in the determination of state waiver to suit).
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b. Congressional Abrogation
The dispositive case recognizing the congressional power of
abrogation was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 02 In
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 103 the Court struck down Connecticut's retirement
act as violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibition
against sex-based employment discrimination.' 0 4 The Court stated that
when Congress enforces the Fourteenth Amendment, not only is it acting
pursuant to a plenary grant of power under the Constitution, but it is also
following the dictates of a constitutional amendment meant to limit state
authority.1 05 The ramifications of Fitzpatrick are significant to the
balance between federal and state power10 6 since the Court found Con-
gress was affirmatively charged by the Constitution to enforce limitations
on the states.107
In a recent plurality decision,108 the Supreme Court apparently
recognized Article I as another source of congressional power to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,10 9 the
Court held that Congress evidenced an unequivocal intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity"l 0 and that such authority was consistent with
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, 5. Relevant portions provide:
Section 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Id.
103. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
104. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (holding that Connecticut's retirement
plan discriminated against retired male employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). The Court considered whether the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, which afforded money
damages in favor of private individuals against states practicing employment discrimination, were
within Congress's power to authorize. Id. at 452-53.
105. Id. at 456.
106. See id. at 455. The Court, however, acknowledged the congressional incursion into the
spheres of state autonomy when legislating the Civil War Amendments. Id.
107. Id. The Court seemed to rely on several factors in deciding Fitzpatrick, including the fact
that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment and the nature of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a substantive limit on state power. Id.
108. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, Co., 401 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). Justice Brennan delivered the Court's
opinion, joined in Parts I and II with Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Scalia, that Congress
intended to abrogate state immunity by enacting the CERCLA and the SARA amendments. Id. In Part
III, a finding that Congress was authorized by the Commerce Clause to abrogate state immunity was
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id.
109. The Court held that Pennsylvania was available by interpleader to appear in a CERCLA
based action as amended by SARA and face a possible judgment of damages in federal court.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
110. Letitia A. Sears, Comment, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas: Congressional Abrogation of State
Sovereign Immunity under the Commerce Clause, or Living with Hans, 58 FORDHuAM L. REV. 513-523
(1989) (noting that the Supreme Court has focused its inquiry into congressional intent, specifically
530
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congressional power over interstate commerce. 111 The case arose out of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) when the United States sued Union Gas, operator of a
coal gasification facility, after successfully cleaning up coal tar that had
seeped into a creek that the state was excavating. 112 In response to the
government's suit for reimbursement of clean up costs, Union Gas filed
a third-party complaint alleging that the state of Pennsylvania owned the
site and had negligently excavated the creek releasing the coal tar. 113
When Pennsylvania attempted to raise its Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity defense against the CERCLA suit, the Court found
that all of the states had consented to this congressional power to abro-
gate their sovereign immunity by ratifying the Constitution.114 Justice
Brennan championed his previous Eleventh Amendment analysis by
asserting that the Eleventh Amendment merely provides for judicial
restraint, not a limitation on Congress.11 5 The Court stated that the com-
merce power exercised by Congress would be incomplete without the
ability to find states liable for damages and that the states had relin-
quished their immunity when they gave Congress the power to hold
them liable.l16 Finding an exception to the Eleventh Amendment im-
munity for congressional commerce power did not expressly overrule
Hans, but clearly departed from the broad-based pronouncement of state
sovereign immunity articulated in Hans.117
whether Congress had expressed an unequivocal intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
111. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5; see also Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,
252 (1985) (implying that suits based on federal question jurisdiction may be brought on grounds other
than the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause, but not finding the requisite federal claim
before the court).
112. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5,6.
113. Id. at 6. When the Supreme Court in Union Gas permitted a suit against the state by a
private party for money damages, the message was sent that under the Commerce Clause power,
Congress may provide for such suits regardless of the Eleventh Amendment. See Merritt R. Blakeslee,
Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and States' Sovereign Immunity from Suit by a Private Citizen:
Hans v. Louisiana and its Progeny after Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 24 GA. L. REV. 113, 115
(1989).
114. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 20. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens recognized
congressional power to abrogate through the commerce power. Id. at 16-17.. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy found that the act in question did not authorize suits
against the states. Id. at 42.
115. Id. at 18 (refuting Justice Scalia's dissent by arguing that the common law notion of
sovereign immunity was prior to the enactment of the Constitution and therefore, the Commerce
Clause was antecedent and overrode the common law presumption).
116. Id. at 19-20.
117. See James Sherman, Comment, Altered States: The Article I Commerce Power and the
Eleventh Amendment In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1413, 1442 (1991). The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment's immunity may be "one of the most
glaring anachronisms of constitutional law." Id. at 1442. The holding in Union Gas escaped the Hans
problem and recognized that congressional statutes passed under the commerce power are not barred
by state sovereign immunity. Id.
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However, in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court expressly overruled
Union Gas as inconsistent with Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence."i 8
The result was to leave the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement
Clause as the sole basis for congressional abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment. 119
c. Ex parte Young and Refinements
The doctrine of Ex parte Young, 120 provides that a suit can be
brought against state officials because the suit is not in reality against the
state. 12 1 The Ex parte Young doctrine has been justified by the need to
vindicate federal rights.122 The Ex parte Young doctrine originated from
a Minnesota case where railroad shareholders sought to enjoin the state
attorney general from enforcing several acts allegedly violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment.123 The Court stated that when state officials act
in violation of federal law, they act outside the authority granted them
under state law. 124 Thus, the officer is stripped of his or her official or
representative status and subjected to the consequences of his or her
individual conduct.125 The supremacy of federal law became apparent
when the Court held that state officials had no authority to violate the
Constitution or laws of the United States and could not be shielded by
Eleventh Amendment immunity.126 Thus, the Ex parte Young doctrine
plays a significant role by allowing the adjudication of federal right
violations in federal courts by bringing suit against state officers, rather
than the state itself.127
As the doctrine was applied to grant relief against state officials
from federal law violations, the Court sought to distinguish between
118. Seminole Tribe Il1, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996) (overruling Union Gas and characterizing
the Union Gas decision as "a solitary departure from established law").
119. Id. at 1125 (noting that absent the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement provisions, the
only other source of Congressional abrogation power was articulated in the plurality decision in Union
Gas, which found that the Interstate Commerce Clause was such a grant of power).
120. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
121. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158-60 (1908).
122. See id. at 167; Pennhurst State Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (acknowledg-
ing the fictional nature of the Ex parte Young action).
123. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 145 (stating that the railroad rate acts provided such stiff
penalties that the railroad companies were denied access to judicial review except at great personal
sacrifice in violating the acts).
124. Id. at 159-60.
125. Id. The Court explicitly stated that "[tihe State has no power to impart to [the officer] any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 160.
126. Id. at 167 (explaining that when state action over tangible property is violative of federal
law, the state is not immune from private suit and so should be the case when state officials seek to
enforce a state law violative of the Constitution).
127. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.5, at 393. The federal courts, without the Young
doctrine, would often be powerless against state violations of the Constitution and federal laws. Id.
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prospective and retroactive relief in the case of Edelman v. Jordan.128 In
Edelman, the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment permitted
prospective relief by plaintiffs, but if the plaintiff sought monetary
damages, the relief was not permitted.129 The Court assumed monetary
relief could come only from the state treasury and refused to order
judgment against state funds. 130 In Papasan v. Allain,131 Chickasaw
school children brought suit under Ex parte Young alleging: (1) that
state officials had violated their trust responsibility by selling the
Chickasaw Cession school lands and unwisely investing the proceeds so
as to deprive the Chickasaw children the benefit of those lands; and (2)
that state officials continued to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause due to the resulting disparity in financial
support for the Chickasaw children's education.1 32 The Court found
that the trust claim involved retroactive relief and was therefore barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.1 33 However, the Equal Protection Clause
claim was found to request prospective relief and therefore was not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 134
An additional refinement of the Ex parte Young doctrine was sup-
plied by the Court in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man. 135 In Pennhurst, the Court considered whether a state official's
violation of state law was adjudicable in federal court. 136 The Court
stated that federal courts instructing state officials on the enforcement of
state law was one of the greatest intrusions there could be into state
sovereignty and therefore the violation was not adjudicable in federal
court.13 7 This definitive decision delineates a clear limit on Ex parte
Young actions; they are only available in cases involving a violation of
federal law.138
128. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
129. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (holding that while prospective relief was not
barred under the Eleventh Amendment, retroactive relief was barred).
130. Id. at 665; see also Jackson, supra note 61, at 11-12 (recognizing the Supreme Court's
concern that an award of monetary damages against a state would come from the state treasury).
131. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
132. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 274 (1986).
133. Id. at 280-81 (stating that the past breach of trust was similar to the claim rejected in
Edelman).
134. Id. at 282 (stating that the equal protection claim was "precisely the type of continuing
violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned under Young"); see also REDISH, supra note
42, at 199 (stating that the distinction between the two types of relief reached "new heights of
metaphysical absurdity").
135. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
136. Pennhurst State Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding that a federal court
may not award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law).
137. Id.
138. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, § 7.5, at 404. In Exparte Young, there was no finding of
state authority where the state authorized the officer's conduct, while in Pennhurst the court
proscribed the officer's conduct. Id. "Thus, if there was no finding of state authority in Young, then
none existed in Pennhurst." Id.
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The Supreme Court in the Seminole Tribe decision rejected the
claim for an Ex parte Young action against the Governor of Florida as an
alternative to the asserted Eleventh Amendment bar. 139 The case analysis
in the Seminole Tribe decision is more fully explored below.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In the Seminole Tribe case, the majority's opinion focuses on a
reassertion of the Hans holding to strengthen sovereign immunity in the
face of congressional legislation. 140 After finding that Congress lacked
the authority to abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity through Article I
commerce power and expressly overruling Union Gas, the Court went on
to deny the Ex parte Young alternative offered by the Seminole Tribe.'14
A. CONGRESS LACKS AUTHORITY TO ABROGATE STATES' ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
1. Congressional Abrogation under the IGRA
After reviewing the specific provisions of the IGRA relevant to the
case at bar, Chief Justice Rehnquist began the Court's analysis by ex-
ploring the petitioner's claim that Congress had abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity in enacting the IGRA. 142 The Court agreed with the
petitioners that there was clear congressional intent to abrogate states'
rights through passage of the IGRA.143 Next, the Court considered
whether there was a source of congressional power for such an
abrogation. 144
Since the State of Florida did not consent to suit, the Court nar-
rowed its inquiry to the two provisions under the Constitution which have
supported congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immuni-
ty.145 One of the two constitutional provisions is for actions arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment, allowing Congress to abrogate states'
immunity to enforce the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.146
The Court found that the Equal Protection guarantees were not at issue
in this case. 147 The second constitutional provision was based on a
plurality opinion by the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., where
the Interstate Commerce Clause was found to permit congressional
139. Seminole Tribe 1II, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996).
140. Id. at 1122.
141. Id. at 1133.
142. Id. at 1123.
143. Id. at 1124.
144. Id.





abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 148 Following the
reasoning employed in Union Gas, the Court concluded that the Indian
Commerce Clause was not distinct from the Interstate Commerce Clause
in terms of the states' surrender of authority and the attached surrender
of sovereign immunity. 149
2. Overruling of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
The Court, in reviewing the reasoning behind the holding in Union
Gas, found that the plurality had misread and misapplied precedent in
providing a basis for its decision. 150 The Court reasoned that the Union
Gas ruling was in direct contradiction to the Eleventh Amendment's
constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal
courts' jurisdiction under Article III, barring suits against unconsenting
states. 151 According to the Court, Union Gas was wrongly decided and
led to confusion among the lower courts in trying to apply the
holding.152 Therefore, the Court expressly overruled Union Gas as a
reassertion of the common law tradition evidenced in Hans.153
By overruling Union Gas, the Court ruled that Congress cannot
unilaterally abrogate state sovereign immunity through legislative
enactment under Article 1.154 Therefore, the Court dismissed the
Seminole Tribe's suit for lack of jurisdiction.155
B. Ex PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE DUE TO THE EXTENSIVE
REMEDIAL SCHEME IN THE IGRA
The Court reflected upon the usage of the Ex parte Young doctrine
in cases where suit had been brought against federal officers allegedly
for violating federal rights created by statute where the statutes provided
remedial schemes. 156 The Court opined that where there is an extensive
statutory scheme in place, a judicial remedial scheme will not be
148. Id. at 1127.
149. Id. at 1126 (stating that the Indian Commerce Clause virtually preempted all state authority
unlike the Interstate Commerce Clause, which allowed state regulation within state boundaries).
150. Id. at 1128.
151. Id. at 1127-28.
152. Id. at 1128.
153. Id. (stating that the dissent of Justice Souter offering a differing view on Hans is an "undocu-
mented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in Hans... [and] a disservice to
the Court's traditional method of adjudication").
154. Id. at 1132 (providing that the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be
the only legislative basis for congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
155. Id. (stating that the Eleventh Amendment established a bar to congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against unconsenting states).
156. Id. (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), where the Court would not alter
statutory remedial schemes through additional remedies).
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imposed.157 Similarly, the extensive remedial scheme in the IGRA158
precluded the Court's imposition of relief in an action against a state for
failure to negotiate class III gaming compacts in good faith. 159 The
Court, after eviscerating the IGRA remedial scheme in the first part of its
opinion, refused to consider whether Congress would have legislated the
availability of an Ex parte Young action had Congress anticipated the
result in Seminole Tribe.160
In sum, the Court found that Congress lacked the authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Constitution save the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.161 Due to this
finding, the Seminole Tribe's suit under the IGRA was barred against
Florida. 162 Furthermore, the doctrine of Ex parte Young was unavailable
because of the IGRA's extensive remedial scheme.163
C. STRONG DISSENTS IN FAVOR OF UPHOLDING CONGRESSIONAL
ABROGATION
The two dissents in the Seminole Tribe decision both criticized the
majority's interpretation of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.1 64
Both dissents found the Court's support for the broad-based pronounce-
ment of state sovereign immunity to be misplaced in the United States
and chastised the Court for not recognizing that common law presump-
tions are overcome through affirmative legislation. 165 Finally, both
dissents characterized the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar as
157. Id.
158. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), (8) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). The IGRA provides that if a
state fails to enter into negotiations for a Class III gaming compact within 180 days of a tribe's request,
then the tribe may file suit in federal court. Id. The court shall consider certain factors in determining
whether a state has negotiated in good faith. Id. The court shall also consider bad faith demands
made by a state for direct taxation of a tribe or tribal lands. Id.
If a court finds that the state has not engaged in good faith negotiations, then a compact will be
ordered for conclusion within 60 days. Id. Should that 60 days expire prior to a concluded compact,
then both the tribe and the state shall submit their "last best offer for a compact" to a court-appointed
mediator. Id. After the mediator has selected the compact most fitting to federal law, the compact
will be resubmitted to both the tribe and the state for a 60 day approval period. Id. If the state still
fails to approve the compact within the 60 days, then the Secretary of the Interior will have the power
to approve the compact. Id.
159. Seminole Tribe I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
160. Id. n.8 (stating that the Court refused to express an opinion on a substitute remedy for the
Seminole Tribe); see Christopher M. Murray, State-Tribal Issues: A Legal Perspective, 75 MIcH. B.J.
1064, 1066 (1996) (stating that Michigan, other states, and tribes are left pondering what procedures if
any exist in regard to class III gaming after Seminole Tribe).
161. Id. at 1128; see also Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474, 1480 (D. Minn. 1996)
(finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act was passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Enforcement Clause, and thus escaped the Eleventh Amendment barrier to private actions against
state governments).
162. Seminole Tribe IlL 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
163. Id.
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer. Id.
165. Id. at 1137, 1154.
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solely applying to citizen-state diversity and not to actions brought by a
state's own citizens under federal law. 166
1. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, he called attention to the
consequences of overruling Union Gas as breaking sharply from the
past and affecting various areas of federal regulation. 167 As a conse-
quence of the majority's holding, suits in bankruptcy, copyright and
patent law, environmental law, and regulation of the national economy
may be precluded from federal forums when states violate federal stat-
utes governing these areas. 168 Justice Stevens refuted the majority's con-
tention that Chisholm and Hans support a finding of state sovereign
immunity barring congressional abrogation.169 Rather, Justice Stevens
asserted that Chisholm could have been overturned by simply amending
the Constitution to allow Congress to recognize the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and define the doctrine's scope as a state defense.170 Hans
need not be overruled to reach the conclusion that Congress may instruct
the federal courts to reject sovereign immunity in those suits not specifi-
cally mentioned in the Eleventh Amendment. 171 Throughout his dissent,
Justice Stevens endorsed the textual meaning of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and found no basis for the majority's brandishment of state sover-
eign immunity as anything more than a common law presumption in the
Constitution or in the relevant case law.172
In conclusion, Justice Stevens distinguished Hans on its facts and
found that Congress clearly manifested its intention to empower the
federal courts with jurisdiction beyond that set forth in the general
jurisdiction statute by virtue of the IGRA.173 Justice Stevens acknowl-
edged Congress' inclusion of the executive branch as the final arbiter of
the IGRA compact negotiation process and was hopeful that the prec-
edential value of the case was limited to the realm of Indian gaming.174
166. Id. at 1136, 1151.
167. Id. at 1134.
168. Id.; see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (permitting a federal anti-
trust action by private parties against the State of Virginia); Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahem, 59 F.3d
630, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1411 (1996);
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that the recent
revisions to the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act express clear congressional intent to abrogate state
immunity from suit), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 1667 (1996).
169. Seminole Tribe ll, 116 S. Ct. at 1144.
170. Id. at 1136.
171. Id. at 1137.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1137.
174. Id. at 1144-45.
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2. Justice Souter's Dissent
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter, an in-depth historical
analysis disputed that the framers incorporated sovereign immunity into
the Constitution or the principles underlying it in terms of federal
question jurisdiction.175 Justice Souter emphasized the Chisholm Court's
holding granting federal jurisdiction over a suit by an out-of-state citizen
against Georgia as considering any presumption of common law immuni-
ty at that time and finding none. 176 Therefore, Justice Souter hypothe-
sized that had a case involving federal question jurisdiction arisen, the
Court in the time of Chisholm would presumably have found little influ-
ence from the common law for imposing a sovereign immunity bar.177
Additionally, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment tracked the pro-
visions of Article III and should be read as modifying diversity juris-
diction alone. 178 Furthermore, the Hans Court never had occasion to
consider whether Congress could abrogate common law immunity by
statute and so its decision does not have bearing on the Seminole Tribe
case. 179 The dissent claimed that the majority's reliance on Hans as a
broad-based sovereign immunity doctrine barring federal jurisdiction
when states are unconsenting parties runs afoul of the well-established
principle that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. 180 Justice
Souter supported his reading of Chisholm, Hans, and the Eleventh
Amendment with a thorough discussion of the framers' aversion to the
incorporation of English common law in the new republic.181
By attempting to constitutionalize common-law principles without
textual support, Justice Souter characterized the majority as "going
Lochner one better."1 82 Finally, Justice Souter stated that the doctrine of
Ex parte Young should not have been displaced as it is a jurisdictional
procedure that Congress clearly anticipated in the wording of the
IGRA.183
175. Id. at 1172-73.
176. Id. at 1149.
177. Id. Justice Souter found that reading the Eleventh Amendment as a modification of Article
III leads to coherence with the Supreme Court's decisions, with the opinions of John Marshall, with the
history of the drafting of the Eleventh Amendment, and with the text itself. Id. at 1151-1152.
178. Id. at 1150.
179. Id. at 1153. Justice Souter asserts that had Hans been from Massachusetts, the Eleventh
Amendment would not have barred the action against Louisiana and the federal right under the
Contracts Clause would have been vindicated. Id. at 1154.
180. Id. at 1158.
181. Id. at 1164.
182. Id. at 1177 (noting that during the Lochner era, congressional legislation abrogating common
law on economic matters was viewed as suspect).




The majority opinion in Seminole Tribe has taken the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity to an entirely new zenith.184 The majority
appears to have integrated the first two theories of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, that it is a constitutional limit on subject matter jurisdiction and
that it reflects common law immunity, in its Seminole Tribe decision to
find a definite barrier to federal question suits. 185 In contrast, the
dissents of Justices Stevens and Souter firmly articulate that the Eleventh
Amendment acts as merely a limit on diversity suits. 186
As unpredictable as this area now stands, several preliminary after-
shocks may be examined. With the majority's emphasis on the source
of congressional power to create federal causes of action, several major
areas of federal regulation will probably bear the brunt of the Seminole
Tribe decision. Another possible consequence is the narrowing of the
recognized Eleventh Amendment exceptions of state consent and Ex
parte Young actions. Finally, tribes seeking compacts for class III gam-
ing may be the least affected of all since the elimination of any meaning-
ful participation by states under IGRA leaves the tribes in the usual
business of negotiating with the federal government. These possible
impacts will be explored more fully below.
A. THE AFTERMATH: UNCERTAINTY FOR CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO
CREATE FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
The impact of the Seminole Tribe decision on private actions to
enforce federal rights against state governments may be most reliably
measured by reviewing recent federal court decisions. In Genentech,
Inc. v. Regents of the University of California,187 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that a private
action under the federal patent statute was barred by virtue of the
Eleventh Amendment. 18 8 In Chauvin v. Louisiana, Department of
184. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2245 (1996) (explaining the
Seminole Tribe decision as adopting "a reading of the Constitution that is inconsistent with the Eleventh
Amendment's language, inconsistent with its legislative history, and unjustified by stare decisis").
185. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REv. 102,
121 (1996) (expressing the view that the Seminole Tribe decision relied on postulates behind the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment for the power of symbolism rather than for any textual
interpretation).
186. See Seminole Tribe III, 116 S. Ct. at 1136, 1151-52.
187. 939 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
188. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 644 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument that the patent at issue was property within the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process when a deprivation of protected property rights occurs); see
also Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 954 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that had the
issue involved the question of whether the patent code abrogated California's sovereign immunity,
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Wildlife and Fisheries,189 the district court found that a private action
against Louisiana could not be maintained under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act due to the state's sovereign immunity bar. 190 Furthermore, in
Prisco v. New York,19 1 the district court found a bar to CERCLA claims
against New York, which signaled the practical overruling of Union Gas
after the decision in Seminole Tribe.192 From these recent cases, it
appears that the federal courts are having to turn away private actions
against states previously thought secure. 193 The federal courts now must
require extensive investigations into the enactment of federal laws to
discern the power relied upon by Congress for specific acts. 194 Thus, it
appears that the Seminole Tribe decision created national judicial
oversight of Congress' power to enact federal law and its power to create
private causes of action for violations of federal rights. 195
B. THE STRENGTH OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONS AFTER
SEMINOLE TRIBE
The vindication of federal rights against state violations have
historically enjoyed protection through the judicially acknowledged
exceptions of state consent and the Ex parte Young action, however, the
Seminole Tribe decision may have considerably narrowed these avenues
of protection.196 In the area of formal state consent, waiver of immunity
then the decision in Seminole Tribe would have compelled the conclusion that the state's sovereign
immunity would bar any action based on the patent code).
189. 937 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. La. 1996).
190. Chauvin v. Louisiana Dep't Wildlife & Fisheries, 937 F. Supp. 567, 569 (E.D. La. 1996); see
also Blow v. Kansas, 929 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding that Congress did not have
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity when it enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act).
191. No. 91 Civ. 3990, 1996 WL 596546, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1996).
192. Prisco v. New York, No. 91 Civ. 3990, 1996 WL 596546, *1, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1996)
(finding that the remaining two state abrogation conditions to the Eleventh Amendment bar, legislation
passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and state consent, were not present).
193. See Chauvin, 937 F. Supp. at 569 (stating that it was unfortunate for the plaintiff that the
Seminole Tribe decision barred the Fair Labor Standards Act action).
194. See Dan Waggoner & Patricia Raskin, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Model for
Federal-State Conflict or Cooperation, 14 COMM. LAW. 26, 27 (1996). The authors assert that the
Telecommunications Act, although allowing for an action in federal court against a state for failure to
approve an access agreement, is distinguishable from other exercises of Commerce Clause power
because of the lack of total displacement of state regulation. Id.
195. See Hovenkamp, supra note 184, at 2247. The Court's activism in striking federal legisla-
tion that it finds disagreeable usurps congressional power and interferes with the political market. Id.
While federalism is a valid concern, the Court in Lopez and Seminole Tribe appears to rely on tenuous
interpretations of the Constitution to tip the balance in favor of the several states. Id.; see also Mark
Browning, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: A Closer Look, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10 (1996). The
only certainty in bankruptcy cases after the Seminole Tribe decision is that it will take many years of
litigation to sort out the impact on the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id.
196. See Monaghan, supra note 185, at 125 (stating that as a result of the Eleventh Amendment's
bar, plaintiffs must either "recast their claims as suits against state officers or bring them in state
court"); see also Gorka v. Sullivan, 82 F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1996) (realizing the Seminole Tribe
impact on transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 which provides that an action containing claims barred by
sovereign immunity cannot be removed from the state courts to federal courts since the action would
not be within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts).
540
1997] CASE COMMENT 541
is sure to be an area of frequent controversy in cases ranging from
bankruptcy 97 to patent law to environmental regulation.198 Turning to
the survival of the Ex parte Young action, it is unclear what the specific
implications are after Seminole Tribe. 199 The Ex parte Young action for
injunctive relief against state officials may prove to be the best protection
left for vindication of federal rights.20 0  For the most part, it looks
hopeful that these actions will survive as long as Congress does not
provide an "extensive remedial scheme" as defined in Seminole
Tribe.20
C. REASSERTING THE TRIBAL-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
The impact of the decision in Seminole Tribe is positive in the
following respects for Indian nations: (1) the decision has reaffirmed
the federal-tribal governmental relationship; (2) the decision strengthens
the common law notions of sovereignty that the tribes themselves
enjoy; 202 and (3) the decision serves as a clarification between federal
and state governments as to their roles, especially in light of the Indian
Commerce Clause. 203
By enacting the compact provisions, Congress stepped into
uncharted territory since tribal nations and states have for the most part
197. But see Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't Welfare, 199 B.R. 129, 134 (Bankr. E.D.
Penn. 1996) (asserting that Justice Stevens' dissent in Seminole Tribe was "misleadingly overbroad" in
deducing that bankruptcy actions against states are left without a remedy due to lack of state consent).
198. See, e.g., Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1295 (D.N.M. 1996) (finding that
Governor Johnson of New Mexico lacked authority to enter into class Il gaming compacts, although
IGRA does not designate which state official may enter into such compacts); Mark Browning, Who
Can Waive State Immunity?, 15 AM. BANKR. I NST. J. 10, 10 (1997) (predicting that disputes over
authority to waive immunity issues will arise frequently, especially in respect to bankruptcy proofs of
claim and appearances).
199. See, e.g., Natural Resource Defense Council v. California Dep't Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424
(9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting narrowly the denial of the Young action for the IGRA as necessitated by
the Act's provision and distinguishing the intent of Congress in passing the Clean Water Act as
including Young-type relief); Lazar v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 200 B.R. 358,
383 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (distinguishing the Bankruptcy Code as not providing a detailed remedy
scheme like the one found in the IGRA).
200. See Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (distinguishing the Medi-
caid Act as containing no statutory provisions to resolve fair hearing requirements and thus allowing a
Young action, unlike the IGRA).
201. But see Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1415, 134 L.Ed 2d 541 (1996) (denying
the Tribe Ex parte Young relief because of the important State interest of stake in controlling the local
riverbeds).
202. See CoHEN, supra note 15, at 232. By reason of original tribal sovereignty, Indian nations
have been recognized by the European nations as well as the United States as distinct, independent
political communities with the power to exercise self-government. Id.
203. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reserva-
tions with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 1105, 1135 (1995). While the Supreme Court has consistently found that the Indian Commerce
Clause justifies Congress' plenary power over Indian nations, some scholars have asserted that the
evolution of the interstate commerce power and the Indian commerce power were so different that
the conclusion of Congress' plenary power cannot be justified under the Indian commerce power. Id.
at 1136.
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separate and distinct interests 204 and have historically been adverse to
each other. 205 While the tribal nations' relationship has not always been
beneficial with the federal government, it is based on firm notions of
good faith and a fiduciary duty on the part of the federal government. 206
In contrast, the tribal nations' have been tormented by the aggressive
attempts of the state governments to encroach into areas of exclusive
tribal jurisdiction.207 Fortunately, the federal courts have proven to offer
the tribal nations formidable protection against state intrusions. 208 The
federal government and the tribal nations enjoy a government-to-
government relationship which should not be disrupted with the advent
of a new economic endeavor of the tribal nations, such as gaming.209
Tribes are inherently sovereign and have retained that status within
the boundaries of the United States as "domestic dependent nations." 2 10
In the Seminole Tribe decision, the Supreme Court articulated the inte-
gration of the common law doctrine of sovereignty, the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment as protecting state sovereign immunity, and case
law beginning with Hans v. Louisiana recognizing that principle of
sovereignty. 211 The tribes as domestic dependent nations may assert
themselves as sovereigns in much the same way as the states. 212 It should
be noted, however, that in the Seminole Tribe decision, neither the
majority nor the dissenters considered the sovereign status of the tribes
as influencing the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in the
outcome of the case. 213 Overall, the strengthening of the doctrine of
204. See Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-
to-Government Relations to Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295, 1306
(1993). "The interests of states and Indian tribes often conflict. Many states and tribes have
consequently adopted adversarial roles as each seeks to protect its own needs." Id.
205. Id. When tribes and states voluntarily enter into cooperative agreements, rather than having
Congress impose such agreements, it is obvious that "both tribes and states should be willing to waive
their sovereign immunity from any legal actions." Id. at 1311.
206. See Leah L. Lorber, State Rights, Tribal Sovereignty, and the "White Man's Firewater":
State Prohibition of Gambling on New Indian Lands, 69 IND. L. REV. 255, 264 (1993). The trust
relationship between the federal government and the tribal nations is fiduciary in that Congress has the
responsibility to act to protect Indian interests. Id.
207. See DELORIA, supra note 35, at 203-09 (detailing the various state attempts to encroach on
tribal jurisdiction in both civil and criminal areas).
208. Id. at 56-57.
209. See FRAMN POMMERSHiEM, BRAID OFFEATHERS 40 (1995) (explaining that the government-to-
government relationship between the federal government and the tribal nations is based on the
cornerstone of the treaty process between the two).
210. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-20 (1831) (holding that Indian tribes
are "domestic dependent nations" and therefore could not bring suit as a foreign state under Article
III Section 2).
211. See Seminole Tribe III, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123-25 (1996) (tracing the history of the doctrine
of state sovereign immunity).
212. See Timothy W. Joranko, Tribal Self-Determination Unfettered: Toward a Rule of Absolute
Tribal Official Immunity from Damages in Federal Court, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 987 (1994). Since 1940,
the Supreme Court has recognized that the tribal nations have sovereign immunity from suit and the
Supreme Court has continued to strengthen that immunity. Id. at 998.
213. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (finding that
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sovereign immunity can only be seen as a positive result in the long run
for the tribes. 214
Finally, the Seminole Tribe decision brought to light the tension in
the United States between the state and federal powers by defining the
rights to be exerted by tribal nations. 215 Much of the federal-state con-
flict in the founding of the United States centered on the protection of
the tribal nations' agreements with the federal government. 216 With this
recent decision, the delicate balance between federal and state govern-
ments is highlighted as the tribal nations assert their own sovereignty in
the realm of economic development. 217
Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin218
sovereign Native American tribes were barred by the Eleventh Amendment to bring suit against states
without their consent).
214. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 324 (noting that in a number of cases the United States
Supreme Court has recognized tribal sovereign immunity similar to that of the federal government and
required that any abrogation of that immunity by Congress be clearly expressed).
215. See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the
United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV.
617, 649 (1994). Both conservatives and liberals on the Supreme Court tend to view the factual
disputes between tribes and states as more legal and political disputes between the federal government
and the state governments rather than as disputes involving tribal sovereignty. Id. at 655.
216. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLjwoRD LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN 3 (1984) (stating that the
federal government's primacy with respect to Indian affairs was the center of much of the early
federal-state conflict).
217. See Monette, supra note 215, at 649. "Therefore, [the] IGRA presents a classic represen-
tation of all the conflicting issues regarding sovereignty and immunity in our system. Does Article III
contemplate a federal forum for State v. Tribe and Tribe v. State suits?" Id.
218. 1 would like to express my appreciation to Professor Patti Alleva for her many insightful
comments and her generous sharing of suggestions which greatly enhanced this article. This article is
dedicated to my parents, for without their love and encouragement, it would never have been written.

